conflicts. 16 When a committee of the International Law Association (ILA) addressed
the definition of NIAC in the 2010 Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law, it did not make any findings on the matter, but it found the end of the temporal scope of application to be a "complicated issue … in need of thorough research." 17 This chapter is not the thorough research envisaged in this report, but will make a proposal on how to approach the issue of determining the end of NIACs.
To that end, the following two questions will be dealt with: when do armed conflicts end? And when does the application of jus in bello cease? This will be done specifically with a focus on NIACs. Considered first is whether the treaty law provides any guidance as to the end of the application of IHL with respect to NIACs, and whether it is possible to apply the concerning framework for international armed conflict (IAC) to NIAC. Examined next is whether the threshold criteria for the start of a NIAC can be applied to determine the end of such conflicts. The consequences and challenges of such an approach will then be discussed, followed by some concluding remarks.
Is there guidance to be found in (case) law?
Common Article 3 applies to "case[s] of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties", but does not refer to any end of the said application; nor, indeed, does it give any guidance as to when these armed conflicts not of an international character may end. 18 Similarly, 16 The academic literature in English specifically on this topic consists of only a working paper by Derek Jinks ( . 18 The clarification given by the Tadić Appeals Chamber that " [t] he fact that beneficiaries of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are those taking no active part (or no longer taking active part) in the hostilities … indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply outside the narrow geographical context of the actual theatre of combat operations", refers more to the geographical scope Additional Protocol II refers to "the end of the conflict", 19 but does not clarify when this may be. And whilst it refers to "the end of hostilities" in relation to the granting of amnesty for the participation in the armed conflict, this only reflects that "when hostilities have ceased, passions die down and there is a possibility of amnesty." 20 The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol II mentions that as the Protocol's text does not contain any indication as regards the end of its applicability. 21 "Logically this means that the rules relating to armed confrontation are no longer applicable after the end of hostilities", whilst the fundamental guarantees granted to persons deprived of their liberty "remain valid at all times and without any restriction in time, until the deprivation or restriction of the liberty of those concerned has come to an end." 22 However, it is uncertain whether this is a reference to the cessation of active hostilities, usually achieved by a ceasefire agreement, or whether it relates to the general close of hostilities, which would not occur until a peace agreement is reached.
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In its seminal decision on jurisdiction in Tadić 36 Although Article 6(3) of Geneva Convention IV limits the application of the convention to "one year after the general close of military operations," Additional Protocol I extended the application of IHL to the entire occupation: based on its Article (b), the application of both the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocol, in case of occupied territories, ceases only with "the termination of the occupation". The latter is in line with the scope of application of the Hague Regulations and given that almost all substantive rules of occupation law are now considered to be part of customary IHL, the limitation of Article 6(3) of Geneva Convention IV is said to be largely obsolete (Kolb and Hyde (n 33) 103-4 . 37 Only in case of a declaration of war is a political statement (and the subsequent actions required under the concerning national law for such a declaration to take effect) obviously relevant. 38 Even though the organisational level of the LTTE and their control over a substantial part of the Sri Lankan territory was such that the requirements of Additional Protocol II clearly were met, this was a Common Article 3 conflict only, as Sri Lanka has never ratified Additional Protocol II. 39 Since a NIAC involves at least one non-state actor, naturally, a peace treaty is not an option. 40 
Using the lower threshold criteria
Given the lack of information on the end of NIACs, guidance will now be sought about what the relevant sources have said about the start of NIACs. If a NIAC only starts when organised groups are engaged in fighting of a certain intensity, then logically, the armed conflict ends when these two criteria are no longer present. Protocol II, the loss of territorial control by the armed group would. 46 If in such a situation, the criteria of organisation and intensity are still met, a NIAC still exists, in the form of a Common Article 3 conflict.
The ICRC Commentary to the Geneva Conventions lists "convenient criteria"
to guide the application of Common Article 3 in practice. 47 However, these have the potential to mislead the application in practice of Common Article 3, given that the criteria were only a compilation of the suggestions made by the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference, which were all rejected. 48 Similarly, the ICTY in Limaj rejected the convenient criteria as being too stringent with regard to the organisational requirement, when it considered whether or not the Kosovo Liberation Army fulfilled the said requirement. been widely accepted as reflecting custom, 50 or at least has become custom by now, due to its general acceptance. 51 When applying the part of the definition relating to NIAC, the Tadić Trial Chamber and the Akayesu Trial Chamber at the ICTR both interpreted the definition as consisting of the following two criteria in order to distinguish a situation of armed conflict from "banditry, unorganized ad short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities": namely the intensity of the conflict and the organisation of the parties to the armed conflict. 52 This approach has been followed subsequently by other chambers at both the ICTY and at the ICTR. The Tribunals in these later judgements concluded that "protracted" refers more to the "intensity" of the violence than to its duration. 53 This approach is in line with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Right's view in the La Tablada case, when it considered that a 30 hour battle constituted a Common Article 3 conflict.
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In Limaj, the ICTY found that the convenient criteria mentioned in the ICRC Article 3 recognised in Tadić ('organisation of the armed group' and 'intensity'), are to be understood. In doing so, it identified the "factors" to be taken into account when assessing these elements, and identified a number of "indicators" thereof. These factors, as identified by the ICTY, have since been adopted by the ICC Trial Chamber in Lubanga, in the first ICC judgment. 60 The next sections will further discuss the organisational and intensity criteria and set out the factors and indicators for these criteria as they were identified by the Boškoski Trial Chamber.
Organisation
The organisational requirement relates only to armed groups. If one side to the conflict is the government, it can be assumed that the government is sufficiently organised to fulfil the threshold. Whilst there are armed groups that are better organised than the government of certain states, the 'organisational criterion' should nonetheless focus only on the organisation of the armed groups opposing the government or each other.
For the organisational criterion, in Boškoski the following five factors with various indicators were identified:
1) The existence of a command structure; Indicators: e.g., the existence of headquarters; a general staff or high command; internal regulations; the issuing of political statements or communiqués; spokespersons; identifiable ranks and positions.
2) The existence of military (operational) capacity;
Indicators: e.g., the ability to define a unified military strategy; to use military tactics; to carry out (large scale or coordinated) military operations; the control of certain territory, and territorial division into zones of responsibility;
3) The existence of logistical capacity;
Indicators: e.g., the existence of supply chains (to gain access to weapons and other military equipment); ability for troop movement;
ability to recruit and train personnel;
4) The existence of an internal disciplinary system and the ability to implement IHL;
Indicators: e.g., the existence of disciplinary rules or mechanisms within the group; training;
5) The ability of the group to speak with one voice;
Indicators: the capacity to act on behalf of its members in political negotiations; the capacity to conclude cease fire agreements. 
Intensity
The factors for the 'intensity criterion' refers both to the way that organs of the State, such as the police and military, use force against armed groups, and to the way that armed groups use force against the government (forces) or each other. Whereas both (or all) parties to a NIAC need to be sufficiently organised, the intensity requirement could be fulfilled by the force used by one side only. As with all types of armed conflicts, both international and non-international, it is possible that one side is unable or unwilling to respond to the attacks carried out against it by another party. IHL would nevertheless apply to such situations.
The factors of the use of such force can be grouped in six categories that all have qualitative and quantitative indicators:
1) The use of armed forces;
Indicators: e.g., quantity of troops involved; the increase in the number and type (army, air force, navy) of government forces, and need for mobilisation);
2) The attacks;
Indicators: e.g., the seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an increase in armed clashes; the spread of clashes over territory and over a period of time; damage and casualties suffered by the fighting parties;
3) The type of actions;
Indicators: e.g., the extent to which towns are besieged or supply routes 
Use of the factors outside the context of the former Yugoslavia
The case law identifying the factors described hitherto, all concerned (breakaway) Council, or lack thereof, naturally cannot be considered an indicator when one of the parties to the conflict is a permanent Council member.
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Be that as it may, since the indicators are not determinative, but merely serve indeed to indicate, they can also be applied to many other situations. 65 Using the factors and indicators as put forward by the ICTY, it is clear that the current situation in Syria qualifies as an NIAC -although at that time Kofi Annan, for example, still continued to express his fear that the situation might "descend into a civil war." 
Relevance of the factors and indicators for determining the end of a NIAC
The discussion now turns to the relevance of these indicators for identifying the end of a NIAC. As mentioned above, it appears that when the criteria of "intensity" and "organisation" no longer exist, the armed conflict comes to an end. Using the factors and indicators identified earlier, can thus be a useful method to assess the end of the conflict. However, a number of the indicators cannot easily be applied 'in reverse', such as the indicator of UN Security Council attention to the situation. Examining the damage caused, might also be more difficult, as it is hard to assess whether there is less damage if few buildings are left standing or if few potential targets remain. 68 The lack of such damage may well be due to these circumstances, rather than as a result of the end of the conflict. As said above, an indicator only serves to 'indicate' the existence of an NIAC, and has to be seen in relation to other indicators: if few military objects remain and a prolonged period occurs during which no targets are attacked, this may well be a sign that the conflict has ended. For intensity, the Trial Chamber considered that it should take into account:
the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes, their spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and, if so, whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. (Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 538) 68 A drop in the number of strikes carried out, or in the case of an air campaign, the number of sorties flown, could be the result of a decreasing number of military objects that can be legitimately targeted, rather than the result of a diminishing intensity. corporation by the government and/or measures implemented by the victorious party. 71 Likewise, instead of looking at the weapons used, an indicator could be the effectiveness of a disarmament programme: the type and amount of weapons handed in vis-à-vis the number of initial fighters or the approximate type and number of weapons initially used. 72 Similarly, when reservists have been called under arms, their returning home could be used as an indicator that the armed conflict has come to an end.
Whereas the focus appears to be mostly on the intensity requirement when peace agreements, as advocated by the ICTY in Tadić, are viewed to be the end of NIACs, the present author considers that between the two criteria, organisation and intensity, the former should be the most relevant for the assessment. The decline in organisation of one or more of the parties to the conflict can result in a security vacuum when the controlling regime, the state, or the rebel force, gives way and the resulting (state) apparatus is not (yet) able to provide for effective security.
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Especially then, jus post bellum would have an important role to play. It is also the organisational structure of an armed group that is mainly targeted by the opposing party. Whilst targeting the leadership was relatively uncommon in IACs, 74 'taking out of the game' of members of armed groups who find themselves away from the combat zone. The guidance submits that in certain situations, the party controlling the concerning territory should aim to 'capture rather than kill' members of the opposing party. The example given is that of a military commander of an organised armed group, such as the FARC in Colombia, who visits relatives inside governmentcontrolled territory, for example, to attend a sibling's birthday party in Bogota.
According to the ICRC, and some of the experts, in such a situation, the Colombian government forces should first attempt to arrest the FARC commander, rather than to consider him a target 78 as this would allow for incidental damage to civilians or to civilian objects. 79 As such, it proposes to apply a law enforcement paradigm to such situations.
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In light of the matter addressed in the chapter, it makes sense to slowly move towards a law enforcement approach in the end stages of a NIAC. When the intensity of the fighting has decreased, and/or organisational structure of concerning groups has broken down, to such an extent that it would be near or at the lower threshold, it appears that there will not be any "direct participating in hostilities" in the traditional sense. The persons belonging to a (partly or fully broken down) group, are likely to find themselves in a situation as described above, namely where the opposing party control the territory that they find themselves in. The said opposing party should then apply the human rights or law enforcement approach when taking action against these persons. If it is unclear whether or not a situation of armed conflict continues to exist, the attacking party should err on the safe side and apply the least amount of force necessary. This would also make sense from a moral and practical point of view: if the conflict is ending, why would one want to continue killing the opponents, rather than starting to think about process that would bring a lasting peace after the conflict.
In addition, when the conflict is ending, it will be easier to bring the persons to justice 78 The commander does not cease to be a target as such. that have committed crimes, because the regular rule of law can start to apply again after the conflict. 81 Such taking into account of post conflict considerations would be an example of the -arguable -application of certain jus post bellum principles during armed conflicts; especially, during the end stages of armed conflicts.
The breakdown of an organisational structure of an armed group (which will, amongst other things, be indicated by the inability to carry out military operations)
should result in the cessation of the "continuous combat function" of members of that group, thereby limiting the right to target the concerning persons. For those advocating for the so-called "membership approach", 82 such an approach should not be problematic either. An even further breakdown of the organisational structure should result in the concerning persons ceasing to be 'members' at all. After all, there needs to be a group or organisation in order for someone to be a member of it. In these situations, it may be hard to identify the parties and thus with respect for internationalization of a NIAC being a case in point. 91 Applying the distinction between jus in bello and jus post bellum too rigidly would therefore not be desirable.
Challenges in applying the threshold criteria
Therefore, it may be useful adopt a two-prong approach for jus post bellum: one legal framework for after IAC, and another one to follow NIAC.
Concluding remarks
This chapter discussed the hypothesis that non-international armed conflicts do not necessarily end only by virtue of a peace settlement being reached, but rather do so by way of falling below the threshold of organisation and intensity. To assess when noninternational armed conflicts end, one could resort to using the factors and indicators for determining the lower threshold for the start of such conflicts, as identified by the ICTY in its voluminous case law. However, these factors and indicators are to be applied on a case-by-case basis as not all of them are adaptable to the specific circumstances in which some conflicts take place.
Indeed, contemporary non-international armed conflicts can be of such a nature that it can be difficult to apply the factors and indicators. These situations also show that it is neither possible, nor desirable, to identify a specific point in time when international humanitarian law ceases to apply, and when jus post bellum 'takes over';
for both can apply, in part, after the cessation of active hostilities.
Some rules of jus in bello apply in times of peace and some rules continue to apply after the concerning armed conflict that initially brought the rules into force, has 
